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Abstract: The question “what is equality?”, applied to the distribution of resources across
races, suggests the following answer: when there appears to be no need for a policy that
focuses on improving the welfare of one race relative to another. There is another way to
approach the same question: equality is when traditionally-recognized paths to
advancement do not give preference to or disadvantage an individual because of his race.
Notice the difference here is between end-state and process-based notions of equality, a
distinction Nozick emphasized in his examination of justice in distribution. Nozick
rejected end-state theories of justice in distribution. I side with Nozick’s approach and
argue that the only morally justifiable and administratively feasible approach to
determining equality in the distribution of resources across races is through a processbased definition. I explore the implications of this argument for Grutter v. Bollinger.
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The question “what is equality?”, applied to the distribution of resources across
races, suggests the following answer: when there appears to be no need for a policy that
focuses on improving the welfare of one race relative to another. There is another way to
approach the same question: equality is when traditionally recognized paths to
advancement – what I will call career channels – do not give preference to or
disadvantage an individual because of his race.
Notice the difference here is between end-state and process-based notions of
equality, a distinction Nozick emphasized in his examination of justice in distribution.1
Nozick rejected end-state theories of justice in distribution. 2 My inclination is to side
with Nozick’s approach. I will argue below that the only morally justifiable and
administratively feasible approach to determining equality in the distribution of resources
across races is through a process-based definition. I will explore the implications of this
argument for Grutter v. Bollinger, 3 where the Supreme Court held that the University of
Michigan’s use of race as a plus-factor in the law school admissions process was
constitutionally permissible, and for the affirmative action debate generally. 4 In the end,
I find a paradox: the seemingly more conservative process-based notion of equality
delivers a stronger defense of affirmative action than does the end-state approach. 5
I will confine the discussion to two races: blacks and whites. However, the
validity of the argument below does not depend on particular facts drawn from the history
of relations between blacks and whites in the United States or anywhere else. The
approach taken is equally applicable to questions about distributional justice across races
in any setting.
Rejecting End-State Notions of Equality

1
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1974). Nozick’s book often
refers to the distinction as one between “historical” and “end-state” (or end-result) principles. I prefer
“process-based” in this setting, for reasons that will be clear in the text. The term “historical” suggests that
the focus will be on groups and on the past, with suggestions for rectification of past injustices. The focus
here is on the present and future.
2
End state theories define inequality in terms of a particular desired distribution of a resource of resources.
One might argue, for example, that the difference principle of Rawls is simply a special type of end-state
theory of distributional justice. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1971).
3
539 U.S. 306 (2003). Although Grutter was decided almost two decades ago, it remains of central
importance in the affirmative action case law. In two new cases before the Supreme Court, Students for
Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harvard College and Students for Fair Admissions v. University
of North Carolina, the plaintiffs are asking the Court to overturn Grutter.
4
The argument of this essay is in some respects similar to, but in other ways rejects, that of Dworkin. See
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 223-39 (1977) (chapter on affirmative action). The argument
here is consistent with Dworkin’s argument that treatment as an equal is distinguishable and has different
implications from the notion of equal treatment. However, I do not think it is possible to merge fairness
concerns into a utilitarian analysis, as Dworkin does, in an adequately rigorous manner.
5
One could view this paradox as a special case of the more general point that the process-based approach
to justice urged by Nozick does not necessarily imply a minimal state. See David Lyons, Rights Against
Humanity, The Philosophical Review, vol.85 (2), 208-15 (April 1976).
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What would equality in the end-state sense look like? One approach is to say that
it is a state of “equal outcomes,” however that is defined. Another approach is to say that
it is a state in which it appears that there are no advantages based on birth or status. The
first approach is consistent with the end-state approach to determining equality. The
second is closer to the process-based notion.
The equal-outcomes approach to determining inequality should be rejected, on
administrative and moral grounds. To make this argument, I will set out a simple model
of the equal-outcomes approach, in order to examine its necessary components.
Although I take “equal outcomes” as the definition of equality in the end state, the
argument in this section applies just as well to any other definition of the end state based
on some particular distribution of outcomes.
First, the equal-outcomes approach requires an equality monitor. This person
labels certain settings as “unequal,” others as “equal,” and, perhaps, presents a
recommendation to the government to alter the outcomes in the unequal settings. To
avoid any impression that I am biasing the argument against the equal-outcomes
approach, I should add that an equality monitor is a general requirement of any scheme
that attempts to determine whether resources or opportunities are distributed equally. In
other words, to the extent that it is costly to have an equality monitor, it is an unavoidable
cost. Any regime that attempts to define and address inequality will have to appoint an
equality monitor.
Second, the equal-outcomes approach requires a definition of equality. The
equality monitor would have to determine an end-state standard for measuring equality.
For example, the monitor could examine the percentages of blacks and whites in certain
positions, and label as unequal those cases in which the percentage of either group
appears to be below some standard. The standard would have to be one that in the endstate, blacks do just as well as whites. The standard itself would require the monitor to
choose a base-line population. The monitor would measure the percentages of blacks
and whites in the base-line population and compare those to their respective percentages
in the end state. If the percentage of blacks appeared to be below the standard adopted by
the monitor, the end state would be labeled unequal.
Suppose blacks and whites invest in different ways in their careers. Suppose, for
example, that 80 percent of whites go to medical school and 20 percent study art.
Suppose among blacks, 40 percent go to medical school and 60 percent study art. In
addition, assume the financial return from medical school is greater than that for art
school. If the equality monitor demanded that blacks have the same income (or wealth)
distribution as whites, he would have to transfer part of the return on the investment in
medical school to blacks who went to art school. That would violate the expectations of
whites who had invested in medical training, with anticipation of the usual reward, only
to discover that they had received a lower return. It would also discourage whites from
making investments into medical careers.
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Now suppose the equality monitor says instead that blacks who go to medical
school should have the same outcomes as whites who go to medical school, and blacks
who go to art school should have the same outcomes as whites who go to art school. This
means that if 20 percent of the whites who go to medical school make $500,000 or more,
the same percentage of blacks should have that income level.
This approach to determining equality is better than the first, but it still leads to
transfers that would strike most to be unfair, in the sense of violating expectations, and
could harm investment incentives. After all, not everyone invests the same amount in
their medical school training, or in their careers. To impose equality on returns based on
percentages that either entered or graduated from medical school would rob some
medical school graduates of the return that usually accrues to extra effort invested during
the years of training.
One counter to the unfairness argument is to say that it is too dependent upon
individual expectations. If the government were to announce in advance that it would
expropriate part of the reward from medical school to be redistributed on the basis of
race, there would be no reason for white medical school graduates to feel that their
expectations had been violated when the transfer occurred. If the moral case against
expropriation under the “equal outcomes” approach depends on individual expectations,
that case disappears, it would seem, when expectations are modified to incorporate the
prospect of expropriation.
This counter to the unfairness argument, based on an expropriation
preannouncement, must be rejected, for undermining the basis for property rights
generally. 6 First, the “expropriation announcement” would have to occur on some
specific date, and on that date current medical school students would find their
expectations violated, and their incentives to continue to invest in their careers
correspondingly diminished. In other words, regardless of when the expropriation
announcement is made, it would inevitably catch some medical students midstream in
their investment period, violating their expectations. Second, for those individuals
situated before the application stage to medical school, their expectations would be
modified, as the preannouncement critique holds. But those individuals would learn from
the example that another announcement could just as easily occur when they are
midstream in the investment period, violating their modified (lessened) expectations.
The reduction in the expected return, and the heightened risk of a further reduction,
would discourage some individuals from going to medical school, and society would
suffer to some degree from their discouragement.

The argument that individuals would adjust their expectations in response to an expropriation
preannouncement reminds me of a series of arguments against property rights based loosely on the theory
that people would readjust, and continue to invest, in the absence of rights, see Duncan Kennedy and Frank
Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 Hofstra Law Review 711 (1980). However, as an
empirical matter, property rights support and enhance investment incentives. Douglass North and Robert
Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: Cambridge University
Press (1973).
6
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Now, obviously, not all expectations present a moral case for being respected by
the state. The expectation of a lobbying firm to get a monopoly, and the resulting
windfall profit, through bribing state legislators does not present a moral case for respect
– nor does the expectation of a thief with respect to stolen money. The moral case
against expropriation or redistribution should not be viewed as resting entirely on
expectations, without any regard to how they are formed. The moral case should be
viewed as resting on reasonable or legitimate expectations, which incorporate an
intuition for just rewards. Reasonable expectations of reward based on productive effort
deserve to be respected by the state. Property rights, and quasi-property rights in the
form of contractual obligations and market-based returns on investments in human
capital, should be made secure in order to solidify the links between investment,
expectation, and reward.
Of course, redistribution does not necessarily violate reasonable or legitimate
expectations in every instance. For example, if redistribution corrects a failure in the
market by internalizing an externality, it should not be viewed as violating legitimate
expectations. Consider the redistribution that occurs when a tort victim is awarded a
damage payment from an injurer. If the injurer acted negligently, he failed to properly
take into account costs that he externalized to others while engaged in his activity. When
a court awards a damage judgment, it redistributes resources from the injurer to the
victim, but at the same time it internalizes an external cost generated by the injurer.
Redistribution through internalization gives injurers incentives to take into account costs
they externalize to others. 7
However, redistribution or expropriation for its own sake, or to arbitrarily
reassign a payoff from A to B, should be viewed as violating legitimate expectations. If
the moral case against redistribution across races is viewed as resting on legitimate
expectations, then merely introducing a redistribution program and announcing its
existence should not be sufficient to destroy the moral objection to the expropriation of
rewards.
Another counter to the fairness critique says that there is nothing wrong with the
equal-outcomes approach, as long as we assume that there is discrimination in the real
world. Equal outcomes aren’t observed, one might argue, in part because whites have
tilted the playing field to their favor. If whites have set up career-channel advantages that
stay largely within their own race, then black medical school graduates will be denied
opportunities to reach the same levels within the profession.
Introducing discrimination into the model immediately changes one’s intuition on
the morality of redistributing rewards on the basis of race, as would be required by the
equal-outcomes approach. If some whites have gained rewards in part because of careerchannel advantages designed to stay within their own race, it would not appear morally
troubling to expropriate some of those rewards and redistribute them on the basis of race.
But the equal-outcomes model does not provide such a surgical solution to the
discrimination problem. It expropriates the rewards of whites whether or not they had
7

See generally, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1970).
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gained those rewards from discriminatory career-channel advantages and transfers them
to blacks whether or not they had been victims of the same discriminatory processes.
Because of this, introducing discrimination into the model does not provide a moral
justification for redistribution on the basis of race. 8 Moreover, the solution or “cure” to
discrimination provided by the equal-outcomes approach may be ineffective. Demanding
equal outcomes may entrench rather than lessen discrimination, and at the same time
dampen investment incentives, for both blacks and whites.
In addition to all of this, there are administrative nightmares involved in the
scenarios considered above. If the equality monitor seeks to avoid harming investment
incentives, he will have to operate with the constraint that every individual gets the
proper reward for his investments in human capital. How should one determine the
proper reward for effort in training?
There is also the administrative problem of choosing a standard for determining
inequality. Suppose the monitor defined an equal outcome as one in which black and
white medical school graduates do equally well, where that means that the distribution of
returns to a given investment path is the same across races. Thus, if 20 percent of white
medical school graduates make over $500,000 per year, 20 percent of black medical
school graduates must make over $500,000 per year for a state of equality to obtain. This
approach to measuring equality involves both a choice of end state (making over
$500,000 per year) and base-line population (medical school graduates). Both choices
are arbitrary.
Start with the choice of end state. If the monitor picked $100,000 per year as his
end-state measure, he might reach a different conclusion to his inequality inquiry than if
he had chosen $500,000. If so, how should he go about deciding which is the correct
end-state measure? Suppose, for example, that for whites, the final income distribution
is: 50% with $50,000 per year, 50% with $600,000 per year. Suppose for blacks the
distribution is 10% with 50,000, 70% with $200,000, and 20% with $600,000. If the endstate standard is $500,000, whites appear to be advantaged. If the end-state standard is
$100,000 blacks appear to be advantaged.
The choice of base-line population is still more troubling. In comparing outcomes
of whites and blacks, should we compare the percentage of blacks who graduated from
medical school to the percentage of white medical school graduates? Or, should we
compare the percentages of white and black medical school graduates that seek jobs
making over $500,000 annually?

One might return to the initial description of the model and ask why blacks and whites would make
different investments to begin with, if not for discrimination? Why would the percentage of whites
choosing medical school over art school differ from the percentage of blacks making that choice? The
model itself obviously provides no answer. However, if such a difference were observed in reality, I do not
think that it would immediately imply some deeper level of discrimination. Preferences or cultural
differences having nothing to do with discrimination might produce different investment decisions across
groups. See generally, Thomas Sowell, Markets and Minorities (1981).

8
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This is a bit like the nagging problem of market definition in antitrust law. The
choice of market definition (base line) can determine the conclusion reached by the
equality monitor. If he looks at the percentages that apply to high-paying jobs, and then
selects a sub-group with certain skill qualifications, he may find no evidence of
inequality. However, if he looks at the percentage that came out of medical school, the
outcomes may look highly unequal. My suspicion, based in part on the antitrust analogy,
is that there is no satisfying answer to this question.
Of the administrative issues facing the equality monitor, the base-line
determination by itself has troubling moral implications. If, in comparison, we consider
the other administrative problem, that of determining a fair return, we can at least say that
there is a right answer to this question. It will be difficult to find the answer, and we may
never be able to find with pinpoint accuracy the correct answer, but we do know that
there is a right answer. We will have to live with an estimate that is hopefully within a
tight statistical range of the right answer. The base-line problem is more troubling. At
bottom, there may be no correct base-line population to use as a benchmark for
determining inequality.
If there is no uniquely correct base-line population (nor even a small number of
correct base-line measures) to use as a benchmark for determining inequality, then the
work of the equality monitor who adopts the end-state approach builds on an arbitrary
foundation. If the foundation is arbitrary, there is no moral basis for defending the
equality monitor’s conclusions. Moreover, the final result may be questionable because
of the possibility of third-party influence. The equality monitor, after all, does not live in
a vacuum. He lives in the real world, and has relationships, based on reciprocity, with
others. If the foundation of his work is arbitrary, one can only wonder whether his
recommendations are the result of a preference for some party who intervenes in his
decision process.
To take a more concrete example, consider the case law professors are most
familiar with, the law school appointments process. The equal outcomes approach would
start with some statistical assessment of the shares of black and white applicants in the
job pool for law teaching positions. Equal outcomes would require that the percentage of
teaching positions should be the same as the shares in some base-line population. But
what counts as a teaching position? Should we look only at the percentages getting
tenure-track positions at elite schools? And what is the base-line population? Should it
be determined by self-reporting, by looking at the people who file applications with the
American Association of Law Schools? Or should the base line (job pool) be the pool of
law school graduates with a certain grade-point average, whether or not they self-report
as seekers of teaching jobs?
Now, I should say something about the implications of this argument. It is
obviously an argument against quotas, since they tend to work on the same principle as
the equal-outcomes approach. Less clear, the argument implies that even goals and
timetables are difficult to defend. Any goal or timetable, to be effective, must be judged
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against some numerical standard. 9 But that takes us indirectly back to the equaloutcomes approach.
One possible implication is that a common method of determining discrimination
– comparing percentages of certain ethnic or racial groups hired to their base-line
populations in the job pool – may be difficult to defend. I am reluctant to draw this
implication because the base-line comparison method often serves a different function in
this setting. If someone is trying to determine whether discrimination has occurred, the
base-line comparison approach is a useful starting point, from which a more detailed
examination can begin. Moreover, in the discrimination context, the “end state” is not an
arbitrary choice: the complainant identifies a selection process that he claims is
discriminatory. Given that it has a more limited use and less arbitrary foundation, the
base-line comparison approach is defensible as the starting point of an investigation into
possible discrimination. However, if the base-line comparison approach is viewed as
both the starting and ending point of such an investigation, then it clearly would be
vulnerable to many of the objections set out above.
More generally, the use of a statistical measure as an inference device is
distinguishable from its use as a way of defining or measuring inequality. In limited
settings, statistical snap-shots based on comparing some end-state result with a base-line
population can be helpful as a method of inferring discrimination or unfairness in a
particular selection process. But even in these settings, the statistical measure merely
gives rise to an inference of discrimination without providing proof. In the broader
examination of distributional justice, end-state measures provide a considerably weaker
basis for inference. Moreover, the statistical approach to finding discrimination boils
down to a statistical proof that a given selection process operates unfairly – a proof that
should be accomplished by statistically eliminating nondiscriminatory theories that might
explain the results of the selection process. In other words, the statistical approach to
determining discrimination has an ultimate goal that is equivalent to the process-based
approach to determining unfairness.
Nozick’s argument against end-state definitions of justice focused on the
instability of any particular distribution. 10 Nozick noted that in a free market, people
would make deals that violate the equal-outcomes standard, and there would be no
evidence of anyone being worse off as a result. The same could be said about this case.
Any equal outcomes approach ignores the effect of individual choice on the statistical
picture that emerges. As a result, the ideal statistical picture becomes an elusive goal that
requires constant intervention by the monitor to maintain.
Constant state intervention in order to maintain a statistical snap-shot of the
desired end state involves the government in an effort to cancel market-determined
outcomes. Let someone – say, a white doctor – develop a cure for cancer and make $100
million as a result. That distorts the statistical picture, leading to a state of inequality.
For the argument that goals and timetables are equivalent to quotas, see Roland G. Fryer, Jr., 2009.
Implicit Quotas, 38 Journal of Legal Studies1 (2009).
10
Nozick, supra note 1, at 160-64.
9
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The equality monitor would then have to intervene to “correct” the resulting distribution.
How should it be corrected? There are many options available to the monitor, from
leveling up, to the extent possible, to leveling down. All of them involve overturning
outcomes based on voluntary contracts.
Process-Based
In contrast to the end-state notion of equality, there is a process-based notion that
looks at whether lifetime channels for enhancement can be made equally available to all.
Note that this would appear to many equality advocates to be the less effective approach
toward achieving equality. The reason is that the process-based approach avoids any use
of hard data on outcomes. An equality monitor under the process-based model does not
ask for information on outcomes of blacks relative to whites. To many, this would seem
to be a glaring example of a toothless program for achieving equality. However, I will
argue that it does have teeth – that are likely to be more effective than those of the equaloutcomes approach.
So what would an equality monitor try to do under the process-based model? The
answer depends on the setting. In general, the equality monitor takes an end state, and
asks whether the processes leading to that end state provide equality of enhancement to
blacks and whites. The equality monitor would not object to the processes merely
because he observes different enhancement or access probabilities. Those different
access probabilities might be based on investment decisions made along the way. The
equality monitor would have to look for instances in which access probabilities differ in
ways that have nothing to do with material investments made by candidates entering the
process.
To lend some precision to this, let us define a career channel as consisting of
periods of investment interrupted at points by access nodes. At each access node, the
candidate is either accepted or rejected. If rejected, he continues to make investments
toward some other access node. Over each period of investment, his likelihood of being
accepted at the next access node is determined by his own investments and the
investments of others. The equality monitor, under the process-based model, looks for
instances in which access probabilities differ because of some exogenous obstacle at the
access node itself (e.g., discrimination), or because of investments made by others (not
the candidate) during the investment period.
Consider an example of one type of access node: a private firm’s hiring process.
Is the hiring process one in which race would appear to be an irrelevant factor? How
would we know if race is a relevant factor? There are certain features of a hiring process
that would lend themselves to making race a relevant factor. To take an extreme
example, suppose the firm showed a preference toward hiring friends and relatives of
current employees. Since an individual’s friends and relatives are likely to be of the same
race as the individual, a hiring process that favors friends and relatives of current
employees makes race a relevant factor, and by doing so presents an obstacle to
candidates of a different race from that of incumbent employees.
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Another example: Abercrombie & Fitch, a clothes-maker that used to specialize in
outdoor wear, but now specializes in casual fashion clothing for teens, made offers to
customers to become salespeople and models for their store. 11 How did they go about
choosing candidates? They looked for people who looked like those in their
advertisements, which generally showed young whites in various states of undress. They
tended to make their offers to whites who appeared to be physically attractive according
to their preferences. The process led to very few, if any, offers to non-whites. Clearly, it
was a hiring process in which race played a significant role. Whether it should concern
the equality monitor is a different issue. An equality monitor might conclude that it is too
trivial to be taken seriously as an issue, or that blacks who were cut out of the
Abercrombie hiring process may have been better off as a result.
The examples I have just given – hiring friends and associates, hiring based on
looks – are cases that would raise an eyebrow for the equality monitor, at the least. The
monitor would probably feel a need to examine them closely to determine whether blacks
and whites have equal chances of advancement. Suppose the monitor decides that in fact
they do not have equal chances of advancement, that in each case the process is one that
advantages whites. What should the monitor do next?
One answer is to do nothing, because the end result is trivial or unimportant. I
gave the Abercrombie & Fitch example as one such case. If the monitor discovers that
blacks had been passed over for the opportunity to be a salesperson or model for
Abercrombie, he might not consider it a serious issue.
On the other hand, maybe it is a serious issue. Perhaps the equality monitor
should be concerned with influencing the standards of attractiveness that would lead
Abercrombie to implement a discriminatory hiring policy. But this approach would put
the equality monitor onto an entirely new terrain, trying to alter tastes.
I have so far considered the altering of public preferences to be outside of the
equality monitor’s domain of concern. The Abercrombie example provides support for
this assumption. It is a tall burden to change tastes, and the payoff in the Abercrombie
case seems too small to justify the cost. However, there are other instances in which the
altering of public preferences might have a substantial payoff. For example, the mutual
fund industry depends heavily on getting people to believe that fund managers are
competent managers of money. In general, investors in stocks do best by simply putting
their money into an “unmanaged” index fund that is broadly diversified, like the S&P 500
index. The industry’s welfare, however, depends on convincing ordinary investors that a
typical money manager can beat the market, i.e., can perform better than a fund indexed
to a broad basket of stocks such as the S&P 500. To convince investors that they should
give their money to a fund manager, it helps to have managers who look like what an
On the Abercrombie & Fitch discrimination story, see Steven Greenhouse, Clothing Chain Accused of
Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A1; TFL, How Abercrombie Ended up Being Sued by
250,000 Employees, https://www.thefashionlaw.com/how-abercrombie-ended-up-being-sued-by-250000employees/.
11
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uninformed investor would think a superior money manager would look like. This need
to sell “image” provides a motivation to use race as a factor in the hiring process. The
equality monitor may well conclude that this is a case in which it is worthwhile to
intervene. Unlike the Abercrombie example, the mutual fund industry involves serious
work that requires the development of useful skills. A hiring process that uses race as a
factor provides differential incentives for the development of those skills, and supports a
set of public preferences that have the same effect.
Having decided that a particular access node does not provide equal access
probabilities to both blacks and whites, suppose the equality monitor decides that action
should be taken to correct the unequal process. How should the process be corrected?
The general goal should be to modify the process in such a way that the probabilities of
advancement, summing over all of the access nodes, are the same for blacks and whites
given the same individual investments.
The examples I have considered focus on access nodes – e.g., the job hiring
process. The general focus here is on career channels, which consist of investment
periods followed by access nodes. The equality monitor typically intervenes at an access
node, and has to make a determination of whether the process is “equal” or “unequal”.
Recall that the monitor finds the process unequal if he observes different probabilities of
advancement at the access node that have nothing to do with the candidate’s own
investments. If the equality monitor finds an unequal process and decides to intervene,
he will do so with the goal of altering the career channels so that lifetime probabilities of
enhancement are closer than in the original or undisturbed state.
The equality monitor has several options for intervention. In some cases, this will
involve some policy that compensates for or mitigates an observed access differential.
This option will change the “access process” so that it includes a mitigation policy. In
other cases, the monitor may be able to reach back and influence the investment period
itself to bring closer the acceptance probabilities at the upcoming access node. In terms
of efficacy, it should be clear that it would be preferable to intervene, ex ante, at the
investment stage rather than, ex post, at the access node. Intervening ex ante removes the
need to intervene ex post, and its associated costs. However, ex ante intervention is
prohibitively expensive in most cases.
Now, note that the first mitigation policy is one that some might call “affirmative
action.” But the term has come to mean so much today that it does not always describe a
policy of mitigating existing access differentials. Affirmative action suggests to many
people the lowering of standards to allow the less competent to take the jobs of
competent individuals. In other words, affirmative action has been understood to be the
same thing as what an end-state equality monitor would impose.
But a mitigation policy is different from this notion of affirmative action. A
mitigation policy is designed to modify a process that already yields different
enhancement probabilities for blacks and whites, where those different probabilities are
not based on the investments that the candidates made themselves. Thus, to alter the
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process does not deny any candidate the reward that he reasonably anticipated as a result
of his investments. It denies some candidates a gain that could be described as a
windfall, and brings others to the level of return that is appropriate for their investment.
In general, a policy of mitigating access differentials is morally unobjectionable if
it has the effect of wiping out windfalls and distributing them to deserving recipients.
The same policy is objectionable if it destroys appropriately-anticipated returns for some
and gives them as windfalls to others.
Application
There are two areas of life in which we see mitigation policies applied. One is the
employment setting, the other the college application process. Most of the controversy
over mitigation policies has involved college or graduate school applications, even
though this is a small percentage of the cases in which these policies are applied.
Mitigation policies are applied in the admissions processes of only a small number of
colleges, perhaps the top 10 percent, affecting a tiny proportion of the population.
Indeed, the controversy here is mostly a case of making an economic mountain out of an
economic mole-hill. Still, this is what people want to argue about, so it is a worthwhile
application of the model set out above.
The college and graduate school admissions process has become controversial
because it is the one area in life where we see decision makers applying mitigating
policies on a regular basis. As everyone knows, the top colleges use race as a plus-factor
in the admissions process, along with other plus factors. I refer to this as a mitigating
policy, but there are really two reasons that colleges use race as a factor in admissions.
One is the mitigation theory, which is backward looking and external in effect. The other
is a notion of diversity, which is forward looking and internal in effect.
The heavy use of mitigation in the admissions process distinguishes it from the
employment context. Employers in competitive markets cannot afford to pay too much
attention to mitigation. They will lose in the competitive market if they do. I would
conjecture that the vast majority of mitigation that goes on in the private employment
sector is insignificant. In many cases, diversity is the primary goal, which is almost
always implemented as a rational, profit-maximizing policy. And studies show that
“affirmative action” costs very little in the private employment sector. 12
In addition to being a profit-maximizing policy in probably the vast majority of its
uses, diversity is also distinguishable from mitigation because it is a utilitarian policy that
has nothing to do with the question of justice in distribution. The diversity policy is
typically adopted with some other payoff in mind. For example, an employer might
12
Harry J. Holzer and David Neumark, Assessing Affirmative Action, 38 Journal of Economic Literature
483 (2000); Harry J. Holzer and David Neumark, What Does Affirmative Action Do? 53 Joumal of.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 240 (2000); Harry J. Holzer and David Neumark, Are Affirmative
Action Hires Less Qualified? Evidence from Employer-Employee Data on New Hires, 17 Journal of Labor
Economics 534 (1999).
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adopt a diversity policy in order to communicate more effectively with its customers. A
state agency might adopt the policy in order to provide better service to a diverse
population of citizens. An educational institution might adopt the policy in order to
provide what it views as a superior educational environment for its students. 13 In each of
these cases, the diversity policy is adopted not because diversity is an end in itself, but in
order to achieve some other goal. Whether the diversity policy is socially desirable is an
empirical question: does it accomplish the goal or goals for which the policy was
adopted? If the policy fails to accomplish its goal, or accomplishes it at an unjustifiably
large cost, then the policy fails on utilitarian grounds.
In the college admissions process mitigation means, in theory, applying a
corrective policy to the process by which students gain a seat to a prestigious institution
so that career channels for advancement appear to be closer to the equality standard.
Needless to say, there are many problems thrown out by this statement. From which base
line are access probabilities measured? In addition, how will the equality monitor avoid
robbing some candidates of the return they rightly deserve?
In theory, access probabilities should consider the whole life of the candidate.
There is no reason to measure access probabilities from, say, a month before the college
application is due. For the same reason, four years before the application is due is an
arbitrary cutoff. In other words, if, due to factors that have nothing to do with the
candidate’s own investments, he was at some point put on an inferior investment path
than that of a rival candidate, this is a difference that the equality monitor should take
into account.
Once the policy is stated in these general terms, there are many approaches that
the equality monitor could take. If the equality monitor decides that blacks and whites do
not have equal access he can try to design a mitigating policy that intervenes at any stage
of the access process to bring about greater equality between the lifetime career channels.
How about the policy that we see enacted, of using race in certain cases as a plusfactor in college admissions? It is uncontroversially defensible under the theory set out.
Given a differential in access probabilities, unrelated to individual investments, one is
really looking at a distorted picture when the college applications come in. One imagines
what a candidate from the relatively disadvantaged pool would have done if he had been
on the same access path as one from the relatively advantaged pool. If the monitor
concludes that he would have met or exceeded the acceptance criteria, then the equality
monitor would enhance his probability of acceptance.
Now what does this imply for the affirmative action cases, the most important of
which is Grutter, upholding the University of Michigan’s use of race as a plus factor in
the law school admissions process? It should be clear that this argument implies a highly
individualistic approach to the admissions process, which I take to be the lesson of
Grutter. Simply giving each candidate in the black pool 20 points, an approach the Court
13
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invalidated in Gratz v. Bollinger, 14 does not seek to determine whether each one
presented a case that merited application of a mitigation policy. The core message of
Grutter is entirely consistent with the process-based approach to ensuring equality.
The Grutter opinion also famously said that 25 years should be sufficient for a
mitigation policy. 15 This statement reflects some confusion on the Court’s part between
the process-based and end-state approaches. Under the end-state approach, a deadline
would appear to be desirable. After all, the whole point of the equality monitor’s
intervention under the end-state model is to bring a desired statistical picture into reality.
If the monitor is making progress, that statistical picture should be coming closer to
reality, and so some sort of sunsetting on the policy should be expected. If the monitor is
making no progress at all toward the desired end state, the policy may be ineffective,
which might make an even earlier termination date desirable.
Under the process model, there is no apparent need to put a termination date on a
mitigation policy. The policy is applied on an individual basis. As long as the monitor
finds evidence suggesting that factor X played a significant role in creating access
differentials, the monitor is permitted to take factor X into account in his mitigation
policy – whether factor X is race, poverty, geography, or whatever. 16 Indeed, the notion
of a time limit is inconsistent with Grutter’s core message of individualistic assessment.
An individualistic assessment would remain precisely that no matter when it is carried
out. To put a time limit on the policy undermines the justification for individualistic
assessments.
Still, one might push back, even if a factor such as geography might play a role in
creating access differentials, why should race play an independent role? It should not be
controversial to note that there are ways in which race, alone, creates access differentials
unrelated to geography or poverty. Race often induces a set of beliefs on the part of the
perceiver and the perceived that affects interactions. 17 Take the case of young school
children. If a black student is enrolled in a poorly-performing urban public school, then
race and geography could appear to combine so that it would be difficult to assign an
independent effect to race. However, even in this case, race may have an independent
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
Grutter, at 343.
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effect, 18 Suppose, instead, the black student is enrolled in a well-funded suburban
school. Could race still operate to create access differentials? To take one example, if
teachers in the suburban school differentially support and encourage students according
to race, then clearly race could independently create access differentials even in the
geographically-advantaged environment. 19
Of course, in a zero-sum environment such as college admissions, adopting
poverty, geography, or race as a plus factor implies a relative disadvantage to some other
candidates. For example, awarding a preference for applicants from Appalachia implies a
dispreference for candidates not from Appalachia. Such a dispreference would be
morally objectionable if being raised in Appalachia failed generally to support an
inference of an access differential. The question is whether “coming from Appalachia” is
a sufficient statistic to support the inference of an access differential. By itself, it may not
be: there is substantial income variation even in Appalachia. Indeed, none of the wellknown plus factors is sufficient alone to infer the existence of an access differential.
However, in combination with other data, such as on family income, “coming from
Appalachia” may be sufficient to infer an access differential. Race is no different in this
regard, and individualistic assessment processes of the sort suggested here would take
into account race and factors other than race in a candidate’s assessment, just as they
would take into account geographic origin and factors other than geographic origin in a
candidate’s assessment. In such processes, taking factors such as Appalachian
provenance and upbringing into account does not inappropriately transfer reasonablyexpected rewards from some candidates and give them as windfalls to others. Indeed, it
is the failure or refusal to consider Appalachian provenance and upbringing as a relevant
statistic in the assessment process that would generate unjust rewards. 20
The Grutter Court’s finding that diversity provides a compelling justification for a
policy that takes race into account is in palpable tension with the policy of individualistic
assessment. The policy of individualistic assessment can be defended as a requirement of
any serious effort toward justice in distribution. The diversity policy, unlike the process
model, purchases its goal at the expense of distributional justice. If it has any impact at
See, for example, the “acting white” literature. E.g., Roland G. Fryer, Jr. and Paul Torelli, An empirical
analysis of ‘acting white’, 94 Journal of Public Economics 380 (2010).
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all on the selection process beyond that of the mitigation policy, the diversity policy
involves sacrificing distributional justice or fairness in order to move closer to a
statistical snap-shot of a desired end state. If, on the other hand, the diversity policy has
no independent effect from that of the mitigation policy, then it is an entirely unnecessary
policy.
Because of its utilitarian basis, the diversity policy is distinguishable from the
end-state approach criticized at the start of this paper. The end-state approach defines
justice in terms of an ideal distributional snap-shot. The snap-shot is itself the end toward
which the equality monitor strives. Diversity, or in some cases “critical mass”, 21 is not an
end in itself, but a step along the way toward some other goal, depending on the nature of
the implementing institution. If diversity achieves the goal for which the policy was
implemented, and does so at reasonable expense, then it is welfare enhancing. If one
views welfare enhancement as the appropriate goal for the state, then the diversity policy
must be applauded when it works to enhance welfare. 22 However, if one views justice in
distribution as a separate and overriding issue, the diversity policy may be undesirable
because it takes us further away from distributional justice even when it is welfare
enhancing.
Finally, the argument here implies that equality monitors should be able to defend
their actions on moral grounds. The confusion between end-state and process-based
notions of equality has generated a bizarre state of affairs, with officials responsible for
carrying out mitigation programs presenting poor justifications or, in a surprisingly large
number of cases, suggesting that their own actions are morally unjustifiable. To the
observer with a generous heart, this can all be attributed to confusion; to the cynic, it is
bad faith. There is a moral basis for equality-seeking policies in the racial sphere.
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